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ABSTRACT
Effective livestock disease management is a fundamental necessity for producers to
provide and the government to guarantee a safe and secure food supply for consumers.
It is the responsibility of both parties to ensure that the industry is appropriately
protected from Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs). Producers, consumers, communities,
businesses, and the environment can all suffer when an FAD outbreak occurs. To what
extent an outbreak can be damaging depends greatly on the level of biosecurity
producers have in place and the livestock disease management procedures
government officials have created. Currently in the United States, more work can be
done on both sides. This study looks at what producers are currently doing in regard to
disease prevention on their operations, what they prefer, and what they are willing to
improve upon.
Livestock producers were surveyed, and their responses were analyzed in efforts
to answer two separate questions: What are poultry producers’ willingness to pay
(WTP) to adopt on-farm carcass disposal capabilities, and what indemnity policy do
feedlot operators prefer. Preventative biosecurity at the farm level is covered thoroughly
throughout the literature, however, a minimal amount of research has been conducted
on producers’ preferences and decision-making processes post-FAD outbreak, which is
the focus of this work. Individual operation characteristics provided additional factors for
the econometric analysis of each study. A one and one-half bound dichotomous choice
question allowed an interval regression model to be estimated for poultry producers
WTP for on-farm carcass disposal showing poultry producers were willing to pay
iv

$15,651 on average (one-time payment). Producers ranked four different indemnity
policies in order of preference, which allowed a ranked-order probit model to estimate
what policies are preferred by feedlot operators and the factors contributing to that
policy. In general, livestock insurance with government subsidized premiums was the
second-best choice behind status quo policy potentially providing a next best option in
terms of producer preferences. By analyzing this type of producer information, policy
writers and industry leaders can create new policies that both encourage early disease
reporting and incentivize greater biosecurity implementation, which will reduce the
effects of FAD outbreaks when they occur.
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INTRODUCTION
With value of agricultural production totaling nearly $400 billion in 2016, the agriculture
industry has and will continue to play a vital role in the U.S. economy (USDA-ERS
2016b). More specifically, animal agriculture represents a major portion of that value.
The top agricultural commodity in the United States is cattle and calves and both dairy
and broiler production are included in the top five U.S. commodities (USDA-ERS
2016a). It is imperative that these industries remain protected as livestock producers
face countless coinciding risks that many other businesses may not. Weather, disease,
the environment, public-health, as well as, animal welfare are just a few issues that
livestock producers manage, and it is up to them to balance each risk, along with the
specific regulations that accompany them. The U.S. government has many policies in
place to assist farmers in handling these risks. In particular, if a livestock disease
outbreak occurs, there is legislation in place to minimize damages and costs to the
farm, the public, the environment, and the government itself.
The following two chapters will provide an in-depth analysis of farmer willingness
to pay for increased biosecurity and livestock indemnity preference by examining results
from a livestock producer survey. By evaluating producers’ responses to current
government policy pertaining specifically to animal agriculture in the event of a disease
outbreak, government officials will have a more complete understanding of the
producers’ decision-making process in the presence of such risks. Estimating
producers’ willingness to invest in on-farm biosecurity methods will also help policy
writers gauge future financial legislation pertaining to animal disease prevention and
1

eradication. After all, the government’s aim in regulation is to ensure that animals are
healthy, production systems are efficient, producers are not unfairly burdened,
consumers have a safe and secure food supply, and governmental costs to taxpayers
are minimized. The results and conclusions of these two analyses on farmer’s
willingness to pay and their indemnity preferences will provide valuable insight that has
not previously been discussed in the literature.
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CHAPTER I
PRODUCER’S WILLINGNESS-TO-INVEST IN ON-FARM CARCASS
DISPOSAL: A STUDY ON U.S. POULTRY BIOSECURITY DURING A
DISEASE OUTBREAK
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Abstract
Biosecurity procedures play a vital role in livestock disease management both in
prevention and in management after a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) outbreak. As one
of the more integrated livestock commodities, the U.S. poultry industry mandates certain
biosecurity and disease safety standards, however, the decision to implement these
practices are ultimately left up to the individual producer. These operational decisions
occur as producers weigh the risks between short-term costs and long-run disease
protection, which can be translated into changes in profit margins and potential moral
hazard which occurs because biosecurity is non-excludable. Producers free-ride on
other farms’ biosecurity expecting that if an FAD outbreak does occur, their neighbors’
disease protection efforts will stop it. However, despite producers weighing the risks of
preventing a disease at the farm-level, they can neglect the levels of biosecurity
procedures that are necessary when an outbreak happens, specifically for this study,
on-farm carcass disposal for routine mortality. When an FAD is reported, zones are
created around the premises that restrict the movement of animals and animal products
across and outside of those zones in order to limit disease spread. If a poultry producer
normally uses a disposal method such as a renderer or landfill for their routine mortality,
they can no longer transport those carcasses offsite if their operation falls within a
movement restricted zone forcing them find other means of on-farm disposal. This study
estimates poultry producer willingness to pay (WTP) for on-farm carcass disposal
methods for routine mortality during an FAD outbreak.
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From an online producer survey, a group of poultry producers were asked
questions about their operations’ characteristics and disease perception, along with a
one and one-half dichotomous choice question that provided actual costs of adoption.
An interval regression model was created to estimate the average WTP and allowed for
the analysis of various factors that influenced the WTP. The results provide industry and
policy writers costs and information that can be used when creating new policy and
plans to incentivize farm-level biosecurity, while continuing to encourage disease
reporting, which together, improves overall livestock disease management in the United
States.

Introduction
Poultry, specifically chicken, has always been a main protein source for humans,
however, throughout history, it has been inferior to both beef and pork (red meat)
consumption, until recently (Barclay, 2012; National Chicken Council, 2017). In 2015,
United States per capita poultry consumption surpassed that of red meat consumption
for the first time since before 1960 with total poultry consumption ending at 105.2
pounds per capita and total red meat consumption ending at 104.2 lbs. per capita
(National Chicken Council, 2017). According to the literature, various factors such as
medical research, changes in household dynamic, and even changes in prices and
preferences in other areas of the economy explain the increase of poultry consumption
in the United States (Barclay, 2012; O. B. Kennedy et al., 2004; Rimm, 2011; Tonsor,
Mintert, and Schroeder, 2010).
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Information about the healthfulness of meat is a vital contributing factor to the
consumers’ demand. Publicly-available and reader-friendly medical research like the
Harvard Health Letter published by the Harvard School of Health has allowed the
average consumer to be more informed about various aspects of their health (Rimm,
2011). In Dr. Eric Rimm’s edition of the Harvard Health Letter (2011), he explains the
percentages of fats in animal proteins and the potential repercussions of consuming
them, along with illustrating that chicken and turkey both have significantly lower levels
of saturated fat than beef and pork. He shows that according to the research, high
levels of saturated fat consumption are associated with heart disease and the facets
that accompany it (Rimm, 2011). The same conclusion was drawn by Dr. Michael Miller
in a study published in the American Heart Association Journal where nurses, over a
26-year period, who consumed more than the recommended amount of red meat,
increased their risk of chronic heart disease by thirty percent (Miller, 2010). Tonsor,
Mintert, and Schroeder (2010) published research from a study concluding that
increased information about such heart diseases and diet has a negative effect of
demand for consuming beef. Environmentally-conscious consumers may have also
impacted the poultry consumption shift because even with the drastic advances in
technology to produce animals more efficiently, red meat animal production has a more
negative impact on the environment (requires more land, food and water) than poultry
(Barclay, 2012; O. B. Kennedy et al., 2004).
Aside from increased public information, the rise in poultry consumption can also
be explained due to changes in household dynamics. In the same study by Tonsor,
6

Mintert, and Schroeder (2010), they also discovered that for every one percent increase
in food purchased outside of the home, it increased poultry consumption demand by
1.9%. Increased food consumption outside of the home (e.g. eating at restaurants)
results from more households having both parents in the workforce thus less time to
prepare meals at home, and it is positively related to poultry consumption because more
restaurants serve chicken on their menus because it is cheaper than beef (Speer, 2013;
Spiegel, 2014). Even with the affordability of poultry, it still represents a significant
portion of the U.S. agricultural economy. In 2016, according to the United States
Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA-NASS), the
value of sales for poultry in the United States was approximately $38.7 billion with over
half of those sales (67.04%) coming solely from broiler production (USDA-NASS, 2016).
Poultry is a major component of Americans’ diet; therefore, producers need to be
vigilant and take the necessary precautions to protect their livestock so that a healthy
supply of poultry products is consistently available to consumers. The situation for a
poultry farmer can change in an instant; one seemingly small disease outbreak can
cause substantial disruptions for a poultry producer and the supply chain as a whole
through disease and response efforts, such as depopulation and transportation
restrictions. There are practices producers can adopt and implement to limit these types
of risks and help facilitate business continuity during such an event. Estimating poultry
producers’ willingness to invest in on-farm carcass disposal capabilities will provide a
better understanding as to what incentives and disincentives policy makers should
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consider in preventing, controlling, and eradicating animal disease outbreaks in the
future.

Background
Poultry Disease
There are numerous diseases that birds can acquire and cause devastating impacts to
farms, consumers, public-health, and the economy as a whole (Hennessy and Wolf,
2018). Two of the most common types of fatal bird diseases are Exotic Newcastle
Disease (END) and Avian Influenza (AI). END is a viral disease that can be contracted
by all birds. With a death rate of nearly 100 percent, END is known to be “one of that
most infectious poultry diseases in the world” (2014 USDA-APHIS). The last reported
commercial outbreak of END in the United States was from 2002-2003 and cost the
federal government around $180 million to stop and eliminate the spread of the disease
(USDA-ARS 2016).
The bird virus that has caused the most damage to the United States in recent
history is AI, specifically, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). This viral disease is
carried by waterfowl and other wild birds (Hawkins et al., 2017). There is also a virus
known as Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI). The difference between the two
pathogenicities is if the poultry mortality rate is greater than 75 percent, then it is
considered HPAI (OIE 2015). Due to the high mortality rates associated with the
disease, HPAI is a great concern for both farmers and the government. The most recent
case of HPAI was reported on March 5, 2017 as a strain H7 in Lincoln County,
Tennessee (USDA-APHIS 2017). The poultry house consisted of 73,500 birds that,
8

once reported, were quarantined and depopulated (USDA-APHIS 2017). The disease
was quickly controlled and no other cases around the area were reported. This was a
major victory for the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) along
with all other participants who were involved in the process of controlling and surveying
the infected area, as well as, taking the necessary precautions so the disease would not
spread to other farms or other sectors of the supply chain. The previous outbreak in
2014-2015 did not prove to be as easily and quickly resolved. HPAI was first discovered
in the United States in December of 2014 and lasted until June of 2015. Over the
course of the outbreak, 42.1 million egg-layer and pullet chickens along with 7.5 million
turkeys were depopulated, and the cost to the federal government exceeded $950
million in taxpayer money (USDA-APHIS-VS 2016). Not only was this the largest
outbreak and spread of HPAI in noted U.S. history, but overall, it was also the largest
animal health event in U.S. history (Hagerman and Marsh, 2016). Action and planning
committees were put in place after this outbreak to research and create policy and
protocols on how to prevent such a catastrophe from happening again. It is evident that
some progress was made from the 2015 outbreak to the most recent one in 2017,
however, more can still be done on both the farmer-level and policy-level, such as
increased farm-level biosecurity awareness, training and protocols, increased
surveillance for diseased birds, and more effective indemnity payment policies that
incentivize the implementation of biosecurity measures and disease reporting without
financially disincentivizing these actions due to indemnity payments being too large.
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A Biosecurity Culture
Farmers have the first chance to prevent animal health disasters from occurring with
biosecurity measures they have or could have in place. Biosecurity is a set of methods,
protocols and/or actions implemented to lessen the introduction of disease and
minimize the negative effects of an outbreak (Muhammad and Jones, 2008). Biosecurity
is recognized as a public good because it is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. The nonrivalry notion indicates that when a farmer implements biosecurity measures, it does not
hinder or take away the opportunity for another farmer to implement biosecurity
measures. Likewise, biosecurity is non-excludable because a farmer cannot prevent
another person from reaping the benefits of biosecurity measures that they implement
(Siekkinen et al., 2012). The entire supply chain from farm to consumer benefits from
farm-level biosecurity. Consumers gain by having a safe, healthy food supply and
having the peace of mind of positive animal welfare. However, biosecurity is also a
“weaker link” public good (Burnett, 2006; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Siekkinen et al.,
2012). The level of biosecurity in place is only as great as the weakest effort. The
farmer that takes the least amount of effort to implement biosecurity measures is also
the farmer that has the least to lose or to protect, meaning, the community of producers’
biosecurity efforts are only as strong as the smallest producer (Hennessy and Wolf,
2018). This is the reason why biosecurity is also an externality. Whether it is a positive
or negative externality depends on whether biosecurity is implemented or not. When a
farmer implements biosecurity on his or her own farm, it only positively affects the
surrounding farms. However, the reverse is also true. Producers do not always have to
10

reap the consequences of not implementing good biosecurity on their own farms; they
free-ride off of the biosecurity that producers around them implement in hopes that if a
disease occurs, it will be stopped by another producer (Hennessy and Wang, 2010;
Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Sumner, Bervejillo, and Jarvis, 2005). The only way this
process can correct itself is if a “biosecurity culture” is created among farmers. This
would consist of farmers informing and encouraging their neighbor producers to adopt
biosecurity measures even though the financial motivations are not immediately
identifiable (Julien and Thomson, 2011). In terms of carcass disposal biosecurity, the
externality is evident. Depending on where a farmer disposes of their dead livestock, it
could have immensely positive or gravely negative implications for other farmers,
people, and the environment.
Disposal Methods
While animal diseases are contracted through several faucets, biosecurity, which
includes the type of disposal method used, influences both farming and supply chain
outcomes. Livestock carcass disposal methods are vastly discussed throughout the
literature. Historically, the most used methods for carcass disposal have been burial and
burning (Gwyther et al., 2011). Today, the most widely known carcass disposal methods
are burial, incineration, composting, rendering, and landfill disposal (Blake et al., 2008;
Bonhotal, Jean and Schwarz, Mary, 2009; Gwyther et al., 2011; Hawkins et al., 2017).
Other current disposal methods that may be infrequently used include anaerobic
digestion and alkaline hydrolysis, along with several others (Blake et al., 2008; Gwyther
et al., 2011). These latter methods were developed to address environmental concerns
11

regarding carcass disposal, but they can be very costly to implement. There are pros
and cons to each type of disposal method, but a producer selects which method will be
the best fit financially and geographically for their individual operation.
Disease Outbreak Zones
Despite the best efforts of biosecurity, there can still be a disease event if there is
enough pathogenic pressure. When a disease occurs, the “Foreign Animal Disease
Preparedness & Response Plan,” published by the USDA-APHIS-Veterinary Services
(USDA-APHIS-VS), outlines four different zones that are established around the
infected farm. Figure 1.1 (all tables and figures are located in the Appendix A) displays
a visual representation of each zone (USDA-APHIS-VS 2015). The location of where
the outbreak is detected and reported is known as the “infected zone” and consists of
the area around the infected premises. The perimeter of this zone must be no less than
1.86 miles (3 km) around the infected premises. The next zone is known as the “buffer
zone” and is a perimeter no less than 4.35 miles (7 km) beyond the infected zone
perimeter. Both of these zones together are known as the “control area,” which is ~6.21
miles (10 km) around the initial infected premises (Hawkins et al., 2017; USDA-APHISVS 2017). Movement and transportation restrictions are placed on farms that lie within
the “control area” in efforts to stop a disease from spreading. On-farm carcass disposal
capacity is vital if and when a highly infectious disease outbreak occurs. The obvious
reason is for those farms that contract the disease and are mandated to depopulate
entire houses of birds at a time. In order to estimate producers’ perception of proactive
disease measures, this study will focus on disposal capabilities of poultry producers that
12

lie within the “control area,” instead of the catastrophic morality that occurs on the initial
infected premises.
Routine Poultry Mortality
In 2012, according to the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), there
were 233,770 poultry farms in the United States, where there were 42,226 broiler
operations, 198,272 layer farms, and 19,956 turkey farms (USDA-NASS 2015). Based
on a layer hen study conducted in 2013 by the USDA-APHIS-VS National Animal Health
Monitoring System (NAHMS) (2014), over 50% of farms experienced routine mortality at
rates of 4% or higher. They also discovered that small farms had the highest
percentage of higher mortality, which also reiterates the notion that biosecurity is indeed
a weaker link good (USDA-APHIS-VS 2014).
Routine mortality is inevitable for poultry producers. All poultry producers have
some way of disposing of their routine mortality. However, if a major disease outbreak
occurs, the producer’s operation falls within the control area, and their disposal choice is
transporting the carcasses to or having them picked up to be transported to either a
rendering facility or landfill, that producer now has to dispose their mortality through a
different outlet since the carcasses cannot be moved off the premises to prevent
possible spread of the disease. Even though the producer is not the one with the
infected poultry, they still lay within in the control area, and if this happens, they may or
may not be prepared to implement an on-farm disposal measure. According to the
University of Tennessee Extension’s Commercial Poultry Producer’s Guide to Disposal
Options for HPAI Mortalities in Tennessee, “all commercial poultry producers should
13

have an HPAI response plan in place” (Hawkins et al., 2017). However, through reading
the guide, there seems to be a large emphasis on the word “should.” Therefore, this
unknown facet of whether or not a producer would be prepared to handle all of their
routine mortality is dependent on several factors. One consists of the producer’s opinion
of how soon and how often a disease outbreak could occur. If a producer does not
already have a safe method to dispose of routine poultry mortality on their farm or the
supplies and plan available to implement on-farm carcass disposal methods, then if the
farm is caught within the control area, the producer may resort to measures that could
negatively affect the surrounding community and environment. This could be as simple
as burying carcasses too close to the ground water table and contaminating the water
supply or throwing them in an open trench that can easily become a vector for disease
spread (Blake et al., 2008; Gwyther et al., 2011; Henry and Bitney, 2010). These types
of questions, along with others related to on-farm carcass disposal adoption (willingness
to pay), will be discussed through the results and analysis of a poultry producer survey.
Government Incentive
When considering a producer’s WTP, other options that could incentivize biosecurity
adoption will be analyzed. One question on the producer survey asks about a
government cost-share program. It insinuates that if the government was willing to
subsidize a percentage of the cost of adopting on-farm biosecurity, would the producer
then be willing to pay the remaining percentage? Other questions consider if a poultry
producer’s willingness to adopt could change if the decision to adopt was tied to
indemnity payments from the government in the event of catastrophic mortality loss.
14

This latter question will be analyzed more in-depth in the next chapter of this study.
Nonetheless, there is a challenge surrounding incentivizing producers with government
assistance because the assistance must be great enough to persuade a farmer to adopt
and report when disease is detected, but not so great that it discourages the farmer to
adopt preventative and disposal biosecurity measures all together (Fraser, 2016;
Hennessy and Wolf, 2018).

Data
In the fall of 2018, an online poultry producer survey was sent out by Watt Poultry USA
and the U.S. Poultry and Egg Association to poultry producers across the United States.
The eleven-question survey focuses on current, individual poultry operation
management decisions, mainly, the producer’s current carcass disposal methods/plans
and his or her WTP to increase on-farm biosecurity efforts (Appendix B). To gather
numerical data to estimate each producer’s WTP, the survey consisted of a one and
one-half bound (OOHB) dichotomous choice question (Bateman et al., 2004; Thompson
et al., 2018; Tonsor, Schroeder, and Lusk, 2013). Producers were given a scenario of a
possible impending disease and transportation restrictions and the question (Appendix
B, Question 4) was stated “Given knowledge of this situation and the implications it
may present to your operation, if it costs $X in one-time, fixed expenses to establish this
capacity on your operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 months would you make this
investment within the next 3 years?” $X represented a randomized cost that was
calculated using the Mersenne Twister, Qualtrics native algorithm (Qualtrics, 2015). For
those that indicated ‘yes,’ a follow-up question was asked to better refine their WTP
15

bound by doubling the amount they first saw, and for the ‘no’ answers, other additional
questions were asked in efforts to flip their indicated ‘no’ to a ‘yes,’ regarding
willingness-to-invest in biosecurity methods.

Methodology
Conceptual Framework
Producers face countless decisions that involve risk for their business. These
production decisions are made in order for the producer to maximize profit subject to a
given level of utility that particular producer requires (Nicholson and Snyder, 2012). For
many producers, the utility is that farming is their livelihood, it is what they know, and it
is the thing they enjoy doing most. Above that, they are profit maximizers. Producers
are also price takers due to their heavy involvement in both the input and output market
sectors (Levin and Milgrom, 2004). Because they cannot set their own prices, the
decisions regarding farm costs are vital for the producer and crucial for the government
to understand when trying to enhance current livestock disease management policies.
To the producer in the short run, not implementing certain biosecurity methods saves
them money through costs associated with implementation. However, in the long run,
producers potentially end up losing more money than they saved by not implementing
because their operation was left disease-susceptible. Thus, biosecurity poses a
condition to producers: short run cost-savings versus long run disease-susceptibility.
This decision is based on risk, and because producers are thought to be risk averse
(Mulwa et al., 2017), the decision to protect their farm against risk in the long run would
prevail, but the producer’s perception of disease occurrence must also be considered.
16

Producer’s disease perception compared to other variables will be analyzed from
Question 6 on the survey (Appendix B). It is hypothesized that if producers think
disease occurrence is less likely to impact their individual farm, then their willingness-toinvest in biosecurity will also be less likely. Moreover, due to cost constraints facing
producers as a result of being price takers, it is also projected that they will not have an
exceptionally high WTP.
Modeling
A probit model consisting of variables from the survey questions will be used to estimate
poultry producers’ average WTP to improve their current biosecurity methods (Hanmer
and Kalkan, 2013; Meng et al., 2014; Mulwa et al., 2017; Okpukpara, 2016). The probit
model was selected as a result of the latent variable approach (1) where the dependent
variable of this model is binary, e.g. either 1 or 0, with 1 being “will adopt” and 0 being
“will not adopt,” and the idea that other underlying factors are influencing that decision in
the model (Moore, 2013). This can be represented as:
yi * = βxi + ε
yi {

1 if y*i > τ

(1)

0 if y*i ≤ τ

where τ is some unknown threshold, y* is unobserved, β represents a vector of
coefficients, X are explanatory variables, and ε is the error term, and for the probit
model, is normally distributed.
In looking for producer’s WTP, marginal effects must be calculated to determine
which variables in the model change in order for the dependent variable to become
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more likely. The maximum likelihood estimation method will be utilized to determine
which variables increase a producer’s willingness-to-invest in on-farm carcass disposal
due to the non-linearity of the data (Maddala, 1988; Samal et al., 2011). Equation 2
shows the probability function as,
k

Pi =Φ [β1 + ∑ βj xi ]

(2)

j=2

where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution of the error term, j is the number of betas
(β), k represents the number of variables that have coefficients, and i is the number of
observations. Because the model will be estimated using the maximum likelihood
method, the likelihood equation can be written as:
L= ∏ Pi ∏ (1-Pi )
yi =1

(3)

yi =0

In order to transform the nonlinear likelihood function (3) into a model that can be
regressed linearly, the log must be taken, which is represented by equation 4. Finally,
the derivative of the log-likelihood function will thus allow the variable coefficients, or
betas, to be estimated.
k

LL= ∑ lnPi +ln(1-Pi )

(4)

j=2

From there, the surveyed producers mean WTP was estimated using equation 5 (ERD
2013):
n

(βi + ∑
i=3

β3 ∗ xi
)*(-1)
β2

(5)
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where βi represents the estimated coefficients in the model, n is the number of
observations, and xi represents the variables included in the model.
The hypothetical latent variable model for this study is illustrated by equation 6.
The illustration includes variables that may or may not be included in the final model but
are included in the preliminary model because they are hypothesized to have a
significant effect on a producer’s willingness-to-invest.
BioQ = β1 + β2 BioCost + β3 Onsite + β4 DeathLoss + β5 Small +
(6)
β6 Midwest + β7 FullOwn + β8 ProbOfDisease + ε
where BioQ is the binary dependent variable with 1 being “will adopt” and 0 being “will
not adopt”; BioCost represents the randomized cost of adopting on-farm carcass
disposal the producer was presented while participating in the survey; Onsite represents
the percentage of current on-farm carcass disposal; DeathLoss represents the farm’s
routine mortality rate; Small is a binary variable that represents the number of birds on
the operation with 1 being farm size less than or equal to 149,999 birds and no being
farm size greater than or equal to 150,000 birds; Midwest is a binary variable that
incorporates the location of the operation with 1 being located in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Ohio,
Wisconsin (See Figure 1.2) and 0 otherwise; FullOwn represents a series of binary
variables describing the ownership of the operation with 1 representing the producer’s
share of ownership being greater than or equal to 81 percent and 0 being less than or
equal to 80 percent; ProbOfDisease represents a series of binary variables describing
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the producer’s individual perception of disease risk; β represents the coefficients
associated with the variables; and 𝜀 represents the error term for the model.
However, fairly large samples sizes are needed for this type of probit model to
gain accurate estimations (Lopez-Feldman, 2012). Due to limited survey responses and
small sample size (15 useable observations once all variables were included), an
integral regression model was created to derive more precise WTP results. This type of
model consists of upper and lower bounds, which enhances the results by creating a
more accurate representation of the data. The bounds are the costs that the producers
were presented while taking the survey for the OOHB question (Bateman et al., 2004).
The log-likelihood equation that was used to calculate the interval regression model can
be written as,
YN
dN
i ln Φ(λZi +βXi ) + di [ ln Φ(λZi +β2Xi ) - ln Φ(λZi +βXi )]
LLF = ∑ {
}
YY
[1)]
+
d
ln
Φ(λZ
+β2X
i
i
i
i

(7)

where for the ith feedlot operator: 𝑑𝑖𝑁 =1 when the response was NO, 𝑑𝑖𝑌𝑁 =1 if the
response was YES-NO, and 𝑑𝑖𝑌𝑌 =1 if the response was YES-YES, 0 otherwise; Zi
represents a series of explanatory factors, Xi are the prices presented,  and  are
vectors of conformable coefficients (Thompson et al., 2018; Tonsor et al., 2010). The
surveyed producers’ predicted mean WTP for the interval regression model was then
estimated using equation 8:
n

1
̂
̂ = ∑ xi β
WTP
n

(8)

i=1

The models were estimated with robust standard errors to adjust for any
heteroskedasticity, and a correlation matrix, collinearity diagnostic index, and a variance
20

inflation factor (VIF) test were all estimated to test for this. All results were well below
concerning thresholds.

Results
Before any models were estimated, summary statistics were calculated on the dataset
(Table 1.1). The range of randomized costs that producers saw while taking the survey
and that were generated by Qualtrics within preset limitations was between $2,057 and
$47,428. Of producers who responded to the survey, 40.2% already utilized some sort
of on-farm carcass disposal capabilities, and the average farm mortality rate was
4.15%. The majority of respondents considered themselves larger operations, as only
26.7% of producers had 149,999 birds or less, and only 11.3% of surveyed producers
had an ownership share of 81% or more in their operation. A quarter of producers
(24.6%) believed the probability of an FAD affecting their individual operation was 5% or
less, meaning there would not be an FAD outbreak that would affect their farm within
the next 25 years. Lastly, of the producers who completed the survey, 47.6% would be
willing to adopt additional on-farm carcass disposal capabilities, showing initially that
there is indeed some level of willingness to expand on-farm disposal capacity among
poultry producers who participated in the survey.
To gain a base estimate for producers’ WTP for on-farm carcass disposal, a
probit model was estimated that only included the BioCost variable, which was the costs
presented for the OOHB question (Table 1.2 & 1.3). A higher cost corresponded with a
greater likelihood of a producer claiming they would adopt new or additional on-farm
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carcass disposal methods; however, this result was not statistically significant. With only
including the cost in the model, the average willingness to pay was $29,609.
The probit model (Table 1.4 & 1.5) with the additional variables, Onsite,
DeathLoss, Small, Midwest, FullOwn, and ProbOfDisease was estimated but was
insignificant due to the limited sample size, which lead to omitted variable biases.
However, because of the OOHB question, upper and lower bounds were established for
the respondents’ WTP, thus allowing a shift from the probit model to an interval
regression model (Bateman et al., 2004; Lopez-Feldman, 2012).
Interval Regression Results
Based on the interval regression model (Table 1.6), several variables that were
collected from the survey pertaining to the adoption of on-farm disposal methods were
significant and could serve as estimators of the larger population of poultry producers.
Producers who already have on-farm carcass disposal capabilities in place are less
likely to be willing to adopt, which is economical given prior investments. Specifically,
these producer’s WTP was $490 less, on average. Although not statistically significant,
the interval regression results also showed that producers who have high mortality rates
on their farms are more willing to adopt on-farm carcass disposal methods. An
explanation for this response can be that operations with higher mortality could be faced
with a larger predicament if under a movement restriction due to a disease outbreak and
if they do not have on-farm disposal capabilities. Size of farm seemed to also have a
statistically significant impact on willingness to adopt. Smaller farms, farms with 149,999
birds or less, were less willing to adopt as well, which could be contributed to the
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weaker link public good mindset that sometimes surrounds biosecurity, or it could be
that smaller farms have less capital and disposable income to spend implementing such
on-farm measures. These smaller producers’ WTP was $19,549 less, on average.
A surprising finding that did not coincide with prior expectations, was related to
producers who were considered to have full ownership of their operation. The model
showed that these owners were less likely to invest by an average of $37,490. A theory
as to why this result was substantial could be that, as full owners of the poultry
operation, the financial burden of implementing new biosecurity procedures would fall
solely on their shoulders, whereas, for a producer who may share ownership of a
poultry operation, they could perceive the costs of new biosecurity adoption could be
shared, thus reducing the financial burden. Lastly, producers who had a disease
probability of 1 to 5% were also less likely to adopt. These producers believe that an
FAD outbreak will not affect their individual operation within the next 25 years.
Therefore, they have a lower WTP for additional biosecurity implementation like on-farm
carcass disposal because the current costs of implementation are not recuperated by
the discounted future benefits that this type of biosecurity would provide. On average,
these producers had a WTP of $36,460 less.
Overall, poultry producers who participated in the survey have a statistically
significant mean WTP to implement on-farm carcass disposal methods of $15,651. This
indicates that there is a market for adopting biosecurity practices among poultry
producers who participated in the survey, which could translate to a larger majority of
poultry producers as a whole. If this did indicate some willingness to adopt by poultry
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producers at large, it could signal the importance of disposal capacity and biosecurity
practices in addressing potential financial risks associated with disease exposure.

Conclusions
In recent years, poultry consumption has surpassed red meat consumption for the first
time in decades. Research on the healthfulness of poultry and lower prices have been
identified as contributing factors to the rise in poultry popularity. With such high
consumer demand, it is vital for producers to protect the poultry food supply, through
ways such as biosecurity at the farm-level. Researchers have discussed the moral
hazard associated with biosecurity and its weaker-link public good notability. A farming
community’s biosecurity is only as good as the smallest farm’s or the lowest amount of
biosecurity efforts in place. It is easy for a producer to piggyback off of other producers’
biosecurity implementation in hopes that they stop a disease outbreak, however, the
issue arises when their farm is not protected, they contract an FAD, and then the
surrounding farms, community, and economy are damaged by no fault of their own.
Biosecurity procedures before, during, and after a livestock disease outbreak are
important, and their awareness and implementation cannot be understated.
Most people think of preventative measures when the topic of biosecurity arises,
however, there is an immense amount of biosecurity practices and methods that are
vital after or when an FAD outbreak occurs. This study looked at a group of poultry
producers’ WTP for on-farm carcass disposal methods by analyzing their responses to
a survey. The survey consisted of questions relating to individual operation
characteristics (size, location, mortality rate, ownership, etc.) and current biosecurity
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procedures. The producers who participated in the survey were also provided with a
one and one-half bound (OOHB) dichotomous choice question relating to their
willingness to implement on-farm carcass disposal practices at randomized cost levels
(Bateman et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2018). Using select variables from the survey,
along with the answers to the OOHB question, an interval regression model was
formulated to estimate the mean WTP for the group of poultry producers that
participated in the study.
Statistically significant results showed that small producers, who fully own their
poultry operations, that already possess some sort of on-farm carcass disposal
capabilities, and who believed no FAD would affect their operation within the next 25
years, had a lower WTP for on-farm carcass disposal methods. Taking into
consideration those variables that significantly lowered a producer’s willingness to
adopt, the overall mean WTP for the poultry producers who participated in the survey
was $15,651. This study aimed to understand producers and create awareness
pertaining to FADs and carcass disposal during a disease outbreak, while also
identifying specific poultry farm characteristics and factors that impact their willingness
to adopt such practices. Policy writers can use this information when creating or
amending livestock disease management legislation in the future, and it will allow them
to see what factors impact and contribute to these types of financial decisions for poultry
producers.
To improve and extend this study in the future, a larger sample size would allow
stronger predictions to be made for the larger majority of poultry producers. A study in
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connection to this one, surveyed feedlot operators to estimate their WTP to adopt
feedlot lot on-farm carcass disposal methods. However, expanding into other animal
proteins, such as dairy or pork, would allow for a more rounded WTP estimation for the
livestock industry as a whole.
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CHAPTER II
PRODUCER PERCEPTION OF CURRENT U.S. LIVESTOCK INDEMNITY
POLICY
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Abstract
Livestock disease management is crucial for producers. However, the government
holds the responsibility to ensure that proper management is carried out because
livestock diseases not only affect animals and producers, they also impact public
welfare and the economy as a whole. The largest animal health event on record in the
United States was an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in 2014, and it cost
U.S. taxpayers approximately $950 million to stop, control, and eradicate the disease. A
main duty the U.S. government has in eradicating a disease is through the depopulation
of infected or potentially infected animals. In order for this to happen legally however,
producers must be paid fair market compensation for the animal. Livestock indemnity
has been covered vastly throughout literature from the policy level, yet research is
lacking at the producer level, particularly on producers’ preferences regarding
indemnity. Through a ranked-ordered probit model, producers’ rankings of four different
types of indemnity are analyzed. The results indicate heterogeneity in preference
rankings and provide policymakers with insightful information on producers’ opinions on
compensation after a disease outbreak and allow legislators to consider producers’
preferences when updating or creating new policies regarding livestock disease
management in the future.

Introduction
Livestock disease management can be difficult to implement, regulate, and enforce, yet
it is a highly essential task that the U.S. government must address. Its significance is
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due to the fact that livestock diseases not only affect animals, but also impact
producers, public welfare, and the economy as a whole (Sumner et al., 2005). The
largest animal health event in U.S. history was the outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza (HPAI) in December of 2014. The outbreak lasted until June of 2015 and cost
the U.S. government approximately $950 million (USDA-APHIS-VS 2016). The most
recent outbreak of Virulent Newcastle Disease (VND), which, like HPAI, affects poultry
and other bird species, was confirmed on May 18, 2018 (Hayden and Cole, 2018). The
largest case of VND in the United States, or what was then referred to as Exotic
Newcastle Disease (END), started in 2002 and lasted until 2003, costing U.S. taxpayers
roughly $180 million in government funds (USDA-ARS 2016). Aside from costing the
United States money and resources to detect, eradicate, and compensate producers,
livestock diseases also influence other areas of the economy such as international trade
and general overall commodity prices. For example, Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), commonly known as “mad cow disease,” was first confirmed in the United States
in Washington State on December 23, 2003 and spurred multiple countries to ban U.S.
beef imports, which in turn, forced domestic beef prices to plummet (Jin, Skripnitchenko,
and Koo, 2004). Even though U.S. consumers reaped the benefit of cheaper domestic
beef prices, it was reported that producers experienced approximately 20 percent
losses in gross revenue due to the price decline (Sumner et al., 2005).
Livestock disease management cannot be solely left up to the producer because
of the public good effect is symbolizes. The public benefits outweigh the private benefits
in disease management because the producers themselves are responsible for
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implementing prevention and biosecurity measures at their own private costs, while the
public reaps the benefits of disease outbreaks not occurring. Due to this reason,
producers tend to underinvest in preventative disease measures because they do not
see the private incentive for them to do so (Sumner et al., 2005). As a result,
government intervention is necessary for effective livestock disease management. It is
their responsibility to ensure producers are implementing ex-ante and ex-post disease
measures through the balancing of public benefits and private costs (Gramig, Horan,
and Wolf, 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Muhammad and Jones, 2008). One way the
government is currently attempting to assist in livestock disease management is through
compensation after an outbreak occurs, which typically includes the direct costs
associated with eradicating the disease and the value of the livestock that is
depopulated. This study focuses on producers’ views of current indemnity policy and
possible changes to the ways indemnity could be handled in the future. Variations in
producers’ viewpoints will also be analyzed based on factors such as individual
perception of a disease outbreak occurring, size of operation, and type of livestock
raised. This analysis and findings will be beneficial to policy makers as they are trying to
conceptualize the best methods to approach livestock disease management in the
future.
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Background
Government Compensation
When a livestock disease is identified or reported in a herd or flock, by law, the U.S.
government has the responsibility to step in and take action. Title 7 of the U.S. Code of
Federal Regulations under the Animal Health Protection Chapter 109 § 8301 states,
“Congress finds that the prevention, detection, control, and eradication of diseases and
pests of animals are essential to protect animal health, the health and welfare of the
people of the United States, the economic interest of the livestock and related industries
of the United States, [and] the environment…” (U.S. Government, 2012, p. 7).
Detection, control, and eradication of disease pests, 7 C.F.R. § 8303 (2012) goes on to
state that “the Secretary [United States Secretary of Agriculture] may carry out
operations and measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest or disease of
livestock.” However, livestock diseases are eradicated by depopulating the diseased
animals and others that have the potential to become infected. The 5 th Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution states “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation” (U.S. Government, 1992). Because these animals are privately
owned by individual producers and are being seized by the government for the good of
the public, the producers must be paid compensation, as it is written. This
compensation is also known as indemnity (Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Kuchler and
Hamm, 2000; Muhammad and Jones, 2008; Ott, 2005).
The agency within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that is
responsible for carrying out the actions to detect, control, and eradicate livestock
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diseases is the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) (Grannis and
Bruch, 2005; Kuchler and Hamm, 2000). The agency is in charge of calculating
indemnity payment amounts for the diseased animals. Cooperative control and
eradication of livestock or poultry diseases, 9 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2000) states that “each
eligible animal will be appraised to determine its fair market value. The indemnity shall
be the appraised value, minus the salvage value.” In other words, the indemnity
payment the producer will receive is the APHIS appraised fair market value less any
other compensation the producer receives for the deceased animals such as insurance
payouts or other disaster assistance (Gramig et al., 2009; Grannis and Bruch, 2005; Ott,
2005). Compensating producers fair market value for diseased animals seems
reasonable, however the government wants producers to see this compensation as an
incentive to report disease early so it can be stopped with minimal damage, and as an
incentive to implement biosecurity at the farm level to prevent the introduction of
disease. Some worry that the current uniform methods of indemnity may be creating
perverse incentives for producers to produce diseased animals and/or to not report
disease altogether because indemnity only covers the direct cost of the depopulated
animal leaving many indirect costs of a disease outbreak up to the producer (Gramig et
al., 2005, 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Kuchler and Hamm, 2000; OECD, 2017).
This ordeal is thoroughly discussed in the literature.
The Challenge
As previously discussed, as policy makers consider changes to the current way
indemnity is handled, they must recognize producers’ private costs and benefits. An
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issue with current indemnity is that it does not cover indirect costs of a disease
outbreak. These “consequential losses” can include, but are not limited to, the cost of
feed for animals awaiting depopulation, loss in reproductive or genetically superior
stock, and loss of income due to downtime and immobility as a result of quarantines
(Gramig et al., 2009; Grannis and Bruch, 2005; Ott, 2005; USDA-APHIS 2017). From an
outsider’s perspective, the largest risk to the producer seems to be the loss of the actual
animal during a disease outbreak, however, that may not be the case in all situations. In
some instances, these indirect costs have the potential to create substantial burdens for
producers. As a result, producers who recognize the damaging effects the disease
eradication process can have on their individual business, may rethink reporting the
disease in the first place and either depopulating themselves or proceeding to take the
livestock to slaughter, which can have grave implications due to the rapid transmission
capabilities of diseases. Therefore, the current form of indemnity could be
counterproductive as it could be doing the exact opposite of what indemnity is supposed
to. It further exacerbates the outbreak of disease instead of identifying it early and
controlling it (Gramig et al., 2005).
On the other hand, if policy makers make indemnity payouts too large, this can
create perverse incentives for producers to produce more diseased animals and at the
least, discourage producers from implementing preventative biosecurity measures at
the farm level (Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; OECD, 2017). This idea is what many in the
literature call the “moral hazard” of government indemnity for livestock disease (Gramig
et al., 2009; Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Muhammad and Jones, 2008). A study
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published by Muhammad and Jones (2008), mathematically illustrated this indirect
effect of higher indemnity. They showed that a rise in the number of diseased animals
being reported to APHIS is due to higher compensation, which can lead to the reduction
of biosecurity adoption, thus increasing the number of diseased animals overall. Some
researchers go as far to say that based on their own research conclusions, even fair
market value for diseased livestock is too high and by compensating producers at that
rate is damaging producers’ incentives to invest in biosecurity (Fraser, 2016; Hennessy
and Wang, 2010). Kuchler and Hamm (2000) explain that in the short run, if reports of
diseases are decreasing and relative indemnities are increasing or remaining constant,
then diseased animals must be becoming harder to find, thus the indemnity program is
working. However, this only works if there is an incentive to actually look for infected
animals. Policy makers must understand producer’s private incentives when planning
livestock disease indemnity programs. The challenge has been covered greatly
throughout the literature, and many of the researchers also offer recommendations or
solutions to improve current policy.
Possible Solutions
One solution to the perverse incentives surrounding government indemnity is a policy
that shifts more of the risk of livestock disease to the producer (Gramig et al., 2009;
Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; OECD, 2017). Instead of the government being responsible
for paying compensation for diseased and depopulated animals, a new policy could
include discounted indemnity rates for already diseased animals and producers
receiving no indemnity payment at all for dead animals. This shifts some of the risk to
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the producer and greatly encourages early reporting of disease because producers will
essentially be losing more money the longer they wait to report. In conjunction, the idea
also creates the necessary incentive for producers to implement biosecurity because
there is no longer a motivation to produce diseased animals (Gramig et al., 2009;
Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; OECD, 2017). A policy that shifts the risks of disease to the
producer while also encouraging both early reporting and biosecurity implementation
simultaneously, is how an efficient livestock disease indemnity program should work. By
preventing disease introduction and eradicating disease occurrences promptly, the
repercussions of an outbreak will minimally impact producers, livestock, the public, the
environment, and the overall economy, which is indeed the goal of livestock disease
management.
A second consideration that could potentially alleviate some of the downside risk
of current livestock indemnity policy in the United States is livestock insurance. If
producers took out private insurance policies on their livestock, then the consequential
losses of a disease outbreak that are not assured under government indemnity could
then be covered by the insurance company (Grannis and Bruch, 2005). The producer
would also still be encouraged to practice good biosecurity as it would more than likely
be a requirement by the insurance agency because it signifies the producer is doing
everything in his or her own power to keep the herd or flock healthy. The insurance
company may even offer discounted premiums to producers for implementing such
disease prevention measures (Ott, 2005). It has also been suggested that government
livestock indemnity eligibility could be tied to insurance program participation as it
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suggests producers who are insured are already adhering to good biosecurity practices
(Grannis and Bruch, 2005). However, there is a reason why livestock insurance is not
as prevalent or popular as other insurance programs such as crop insurance. Livestock
disease insurance comes with high risk and large payouts if an outbreak were to occur,
which companies may not want to undertake. Producers also may not want to make the
business decision to pay the high premiums it would involve for the insurance company
to offer that type of expensive coverage (Hennessy and Wolf, 2018; Ott, 2005). There
are professional opinions analyzing the pros and cons of livestock disease insurance,
however, the results of this study will help contribute to a more complete understanding
of producer opinions on government indemnity, which will be valuable to U.S. policy
makers who could be updating current livestock disease policy and writing new
legislation in the future.

Data
A survey was sent out in May of 2017 to feedlot owners through a popular cattle
producer magazine, Feedlot Magazine, (Appendix B), and two follow-up emails were
sent out to producers after the initial survey dispersal. From the survey data, a total of
139 respondents were represented. The survey consisted of questions aimed toward
producers’ current on-farm carcass disposal methods and their views on current
government indemnity policy. Question 7 on the feedlot survey provided four different
indemnity policies and asked producers to rank the choices in order of preference with
‘1’ being most preferred and ‘4’ being the least preferred. The four options were
‘Indemnity equal to current market value of animal if sold on day of claim,’ ‘Indemnity
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equal to current market value or cost to raise animal, whichever is the highest but
requires feedlots sharing farm receipts,’ ‘Indemnity funds available based upon
evidence of “best-effort” biosecurity practices being in place through feedlot inspection,’
and ‘Indemnity funds available through private insurance programs, where premiums
are subsidized by the government.’ By analyzing how producers ranked these indemnity
options, the results can prove valuable in creating or modifying current policy by
understanding how indemnity is perceived at the farm-level and by knowing what
producers prefer.

Methodology
Conceptual Framework
When considering policies that are intended to benefit producers such as government
compensation after a livestock disease outbreak, it is vital to understand how producers
make decisions in the presence of risk. Producers are said to be risk averse (Mulwa et
al., 2017). However, they are also profit maximizers because a farm is a business, and
if that business is not profitable, it cannot persist (Nicholson and Snyder, 2012).
Therefore, the producer must weigh the odds of risk and profit when making cost
decisions. Other factors are also included in this decision-making process, and through
this study, the specific demographics and variables that impact a producer’s perception
on indemnity policy will be realized.
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Modeling
A ranked-order probit model will be used to estimate the impacts specific independent
variables collected from the survey data have on ranked-order dependent variables.
First, summary statistics and tabulations of the data will be computed and analyzed to
understand the overall survey and test for the presence of perfect collinearity. Next, an
ordered probit model will allow conclusions to be drawn about what factors determine
the ranking order of the four indemnity options. Such a model is derived from an
underlying latent variable model with thresholds, or cuts-offs, creating the bounds for
the four rankings. These thresholds are necessary for the regression because the
rankings 1, 2, 3, and 4 are ordinal, but the actual numbers themselves do not mean
anything (Chiburis and Lokshin, 2007; Gutiérrez et al., 2016; Katchova, 2013a; P.
Kennedy, 2003). The latent variable model for this probit can be illustrated as:
y*i = βxi + ε
*

1, if yi ≤ τ1
yi =

(9)

2, if τ2 ≥ y*i > τ1
3, if τ3 ≥ y*i > τ2
*

{ 4, if yi > τ3
where y* is unobserved, β represents the coefficients on variables x, τ are the unknown
thresholds or cut off points, and ε is the error term that is normally distributed for the
probit model. The derivation process to get to the maximum likelihood distribution
function (11) is shown in equation (10) (Wooldridge, 2001).
P(y=1) = P(y* ≤ τ1 ) = P( βx+ε ≤τ1 ) = Φ(τ1 -βx)

(10)
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P(y=2) = P(τ2 ≥ y*i > τ1 ) = P( τ2 ≥ βx+ε > τ1 ) = Φ(τ2 -βx)-Φ(τ1 -βx)
P(y=3) = P(τ3 ≥ y*i > τ2 ) = P( τ3 ≥ βx+ε > τ2 ) = Φ(τ3 -βx)-Φ(τ2 -βx)
P(y=4) =P(y * > τ3 ) = P( βx+ε > τ3 ) = Φ[1-(τ3 -βx)]
where P is the probability and Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
L= ∏ Φ(τ1 -βx) ∏ [Φ(τ2 -βx)-Φ(τ1 -βx)]
y=1

y=2

(11)
∏ [Φ(τ3 -βx)-Φ(τ2 -βx)] ∏ Φ[1-(τ3 -βx)]
y=3

y=4

Similar to Chapter 1, the log-likelihood function (12) will allow the factors that determine
the order of the indemnity options to be estimated by linear regression.
LL= ∑ ln Φ(τ1 -βx) + ∑ ln [Φ(τ2 -βx)-Φ(τ1 -βx)]
y=1

y=2

(12)
+ ∑ ln [Φ(τ3 -βx)-Φ(τ2 -βx)] + ∑ ln Φ[1-(τ3 -βx)]
y=3

y=4

The latent variable model that will be used for this analysis will look very similar to the
model used in Chapter 1 equation (6). However, instead of estimating the likelihood to
adopt, in this model, the dependent variable (y) will be the likelihood of ranking the four
indemnity options; see equation (13). A separate model for each indemnity option will
be estimated. Thus, the factors or variables that contribute to producer’s various
rankings of the polices can be analyzed.
Indemnity Policy Ranking = β1 + β2 Midwest + β3 FullOwn +
(13)
β4 Small + β5 Onsite + β6 DeathLoss + β7 ProbOfDisease + ε
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where Indemnity Policy Ranking is the ordinal dependent variable between 1 and 4 with
1 being “most preferred” indemnity choice and 4 being “least preferred”; Midwest
represents a series of binary variables describing the region in which the operation is
located in the U.S.; FullOwn represents a series of binary variables describing the
ownership of the operation with 1 representing the producer’s share of ownership being
greater than or equal to 81 percent and 0 being less than or equal to 80 percent. Small
represents a series of binary variables describing the size of the operation with 1 being
less than or equal to 1,999 head and 0 being greater than or equal to 2,000 head;
ProbOfDisease represents a series of binary variables describing the producer’s
individual perception of disease risk; DeathLoss represents the farm’s routine livestock
mortality rate; and 𝜀 represents the error term for the model.
All computations and calculations for this ordered probit regression will be
estimated in Stata (Table 2.2). As already stated, the magnitude of the regression
coefficients will not mean anything due to different scale factors, however the sign of the
coefficients can be interpreted as a positive or negative effect on the dependent
variable. By calculating the marginal effects (Table 2.3 - 2.6), the coefficients then
represent a numerical percentage of impact on the dependent variable and can be
interpreted as a “one unit increase in variable x is either more likely or less likely to be a
specific y (ranked dependent variable)” for continuous variables and “the likelihood of
variable x being present (the 1) compared to the excluded variable (the 0)” for binary
variables (Katchova, 2013b).
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The ordered probit model was ran with robust standard errors to adjust for
potential heteroskedasticity. With this type of ordered regression, it is also imperative to
test and confirm that no perfect collinearity is present within the model. A correlation
matrix, variance inflation factor (VIF) test, and condition index number were all
computed and indicated that no perfect collinearity was occurring in the model.

Results
Analyzing the survey data allows essential foreknowledge to be gained before any
regressions are calculated or models are estimated. According to the summary statistics
(Table 2.1) of all 64 observations (number of respondents who answered the indemnity
question) utilized in the study, indemnity equal to current market value was ranked
lower more often concluding that overall, it was the most preferred method of indemnity
among the producers who were surveyed. On average, 29.5% of those producers fully
owned their operation (ownership greater than or equal to 81%); 30.2% were small
farms (less than or equal to 1,999 head); 50.0% used on-farm carcass disposal
methods; the average mortality rate, or death rate, was 1.9%; 45.5% of surveyed
producers believed the probability of animal disease outbreak affecting their operation
was between 1 and 5%; and 33.4% of producers believed an outbreak was essentially
not going to happen in the near or medium future (probability less than or equal to 1%).
Figure 2.1 displays an illustration of the tabulations for each of the four indemnity
policies. Coinciding with the summary statistics, the greatest number of producers
(54.7%) selected market value as their most preferred indemnity policy. Focusing on
that majority, 40% of those ranked subsidized insurance as their second choice, and
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57.1% of those producers ranked the policy linked to cost raising of animal upon sharing
farm receipts as their third choice, leaving indemnity linked to biosecurity efforts as the
least preferred policy. Thus, before taking any other variables into consideration, on
average, producer’s rankings of the four indemnity policies are as follows starting with
the most preferred to the least preferred:
(1) Indemnity equal to current market value of animal if sold on day of claim
(2) Indemnity funds available through private insurance programs, where premiums
are subsidized by the government
(3) Indemnity equal to current market value or cost to raise animal, whichever is the
highest but requires feedlots sharing farm receipts
(4) Indemnity funds available based upon evidence of “best-effort” biosecurity
practices being in place through feedlot inspection
Small Feedlots
According to the ordered probit regression (Table 2.2), small feedlots, those with 1,999
head or less, are more likely to rank the indemnity policy pertaining to biosecurity efforts
higher, meaning they prefer it less over other policies because a higher ranking
corresponds with a less preferred choice in this model. The marginal effects for this
indemnity policy (Table 2.5) estimated that small producers are 13.9% less likely to rank
biosecurity efforts as their most preferred indemnity policy and 23.2% more likely to
rank it as their least preferred choice. These results were expected as smaller farms
have less disposable income to spend on additional or advanced biosecurity practices
compared to larger farms who probably already have such biosecurity in place or have
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the financial means to implement such measures. This result can help formulate new or
changing indemnity policies in the future. For example, if indemnity legislation were to
change and become linked to biosecurity efforts, it may be more economical to have
various levels of biosecurity expectations for the varying farm sizes across the United
States. A policy like this could benefit all farms in regard to animal disease prevention,
and it would also take into consideration the smaller producers who do not have as
much disposable income to spend on implementing as much biosecurity as larger farms
could.
Perception of Disease Likelihood
Producers who believe that the probability of a disease impacting their individual
operation is between 1% and 5%, or that a disease will happen but only once over the
next 25 years, are 27.3% more likely to rank the indemnity policy pertaining to
biosecurity efforts as their least preferred choice (Table 2.5). This result makes
economic sense. Biosecurity is a set of actions and protocols put in place to stop the
introduction of a disease and lessen the effects of an outbreak if one were to occur
(Muhammad and Jones, 2008). If producers perceive that there is not an impending
threat of disease to their individual farm, they are likely less concerned with
implementing biosecurity. Those same producers were estimated to be 8.9% less likely
to rank biosecurity efforts as their second policy choice, which coincides with the
tabulations of the variable because 41.9% of producers whose probability of disease
was between 1 and 5% ranked subsidized insurance as their second choice.

43

The same producers who believe that a disease outbreak will occur, but not
anytime soon, were 10.4% more likely to rank subsidized insurance as their most
preferred indemnity policy choice, 12.6% more likely to rank it as their second choice,
and 19.9% less likely to rank it as their least preferred method of receiving indemnity
(Table 2.6). Based on these results, producers whose probability of impending disease
is low, would rather have their indemnity payments tied to the government subsidizing
premiums for insurance on their livestock rather than implementing biosecurity
measures on their own.

Conclusions
Livestock indemnity is mandated by the government, but it is essential for producers
during a livestock disease outbreak. Currently, indemnity compensation for a diseased
or depopulated animal is paid based on the fair market value of the animal as estimated
by AHPIS (Gramig et al., 2009; Grannis and Bruch, 2005; Ott, 2005). However,
researchers have identified potential flaws with this current indemnity policy, such as
possibly incentivizing the production of diseased animals and/or the disincentive to
report an animal disease or implement preventative biosecurity measures altogether.
Some possible solutions to these challenges that have been heavily discussed within
the literature include livestock insurance and shifting more of the risk of a livestock
disease to the producer by offering no compensation for dead animals and discounted
compensation for already diseased animals. However, something that has not been
researched as intently are producers’ preferences regarding current livestock indemnity
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policy in the United States, which is why this study is valuable. Through survey
responses, producers’ rankings of four different indemnity polices were analyzed.
A majority of producers’ most preferred method of indemnity was the current
policy of fair market value. However, if policy writers were to take into consideration the
issues that have been realized regarding this current policy and amend current livestock
indemnity legislation, the indemnity policy relating to livestock insurance with the
government subsidizing the premiums was the next best option, according to the
majority of producers who participated in the survey. 46% of all producers surveyed had
a very low perception of disease outbreak, meaning they did not think that an animal
disease would not impact their own operation within the next 25 years. Statistically
significant results showed that these producers were especially fond of the subsidized
insurance indemnity policy. Of those same producers, a majority chose indemnity
linked to “best-effort” biosecurity practices as their least preferred choice. Significant
results concluded that small producers, those with less than or equal to 1,999 head,
also ranked the policy linked to biosecurity as their least favorite.
From this study, it was determined that producers prefer the current method of
indemnity compensation after a livestock disease outbreak. However, if legislators were
to amend the policy based on issues arising due to incentives or disincentives the
current methods were creating, producers favor an indemnity policy tied to livestock
insurance with government subsidized premiums, and they do not like the idea of
indemnity compensation being linked to biosecurity practices although a policy with
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various levels of biosecurity expectations based on varying farm sizes might change
their preferences.
There was a main limitation in this study. The amount of observations limited the
number of variables that could be included in the model and inhibited a greater amount
of statistical significance within the results. This study could be strengthened by having
broader survey response rates. This could be accomplished by collecting survey
responses from other than just feedlot producers. Responses from producers of other
animal proteins, such as poultry, swine, or dairy, would greatly strengthen the study and
allow for more well-rounded conclusions to be drawn and recommended to legislators
regarding livestock indemnity policy in the United States. However, limitations could
also exist in such an all-encompassing model because livestock producers of varying
proteins have different motives for ranking policies specific ways. These differences
would have to be able to be accounted for in a future model.
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CONCLUSION
The largest animal health event in U.S. history was an outbreak of Highly Pathenogenic
Avian Influenza in 2014, and it cost U.S. taxpayers over $950 million for the government
to stop and eradicate the disease (USDA-APHIS-VS 2016). When a foreign animal
disease (FAD) outbreak occurs, it affects so many more facets of life than just the
animals and producers. Consumers are impacted by the price changes at the grocery
store when the food supply gets interrupted. If the excessive carcass production due to
disease and depopulation is not handled properly, the environment suffers. Producers
lose profits due to downtime in business operations and decreased prices. Government
officials at organizations like the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
have to use additional resources to stop, control, and eradicate the FAD, and those
financial resources come from U.S. taxpayers. As a result of each of these, livestock
disease management is extremely important, and the responsibility to ensure that it is
carried out efficiently and effectively, falls on both the producer and the government.
These studies looked at two specific types of livestock disease management
post-FAD outbreak: on-farm carcass disposal and indemnity. The ability to dispose of
livestock carcasses onsite during an FAD outbreak is highly favored and sought after by
the government because for farms who normally carry their routine mortality offsite to a
renderer or landfill, that may no longer be an option due to movement restrictions.
These restrictions are set forth by APHIS and impact the farms that may fall within a
certain specified outbreak zone (Hawkins et al., 2017; USDA-APHIS-VS 2017).
Indemnity, which is the compensation producers receive when the government has to
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come in and depopulate animals due to an FAD, plays a vital role in livestock disease
management. The current indemnity policy in the United States is an APHIS approved
fair market value for the depopulated animal (Gramig et al., 2009; Grannis and Bruch,
2005; Ott, 2005). However, researchers have recently identified some potential issues
with this current method such as incentivizing the production of diseased animals or
disincentivizing producers form either reporting an FAD or implementing preventative
biosecurity measures altogether. If these concerns became realized in a quantifiable
way and legislators want to amend the current policy, it will be beneficial to know what
policies producers themselves prefer, and what influences those preferences.
Results showed that of all the poultry producers who participated in the survey,
the mean WTP to adopt on-farm carcass disposal capabilities was $15,651.
Characteristics such as size, ownership percentage, current biosecurity methods, and
disease perception significantly contributed to estimating their WTP. For the second
study, feedlot operators preferred the indemnity policy that is currently in place, which is
fair market value for the animal. However, the second favored option was livestock
insurance with premiums subsidized by the government, and the least preferred method
was an indemnity policy tied to a farm’s biosecurity efforts. Similar to the first study,
characteristics such as size and disease perception had a significant impact on policy
selection.
The information that both of these studies provide can be invaluable to
government officials and policy writers in regard to livestock disease management. In
order to efficiently control the repercussions of an FAD outbreak, legislators may want
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to know how to incentivize producers to adopt on-farm carcass disposal methods to
minimize community and environmental damage that could be caused due to
transportation restrictions. By knowing the estimated WTP for the producers surveyed, it
allows greater understanding of cost thresholds and can improve analyses to determine
if something such as a subsidy program, could be implemented for producers to adopt
these biosecurity measures. Likewise, with the current indemnity policy concerns that
have been identified by researchers, policy writers and animal health officials may want
to amend the form in which current indemnity is handled. By knowing what producers
actually prefer and what factors contribute to those preferences, a more well-rounded,
efficient policy can be created.
Limitations to these studies included sample size and limited classification of
each group. By increasing the amount of survey responses, stronger, more significant
predictions can be made for each group. Moreover, broadening both studies to include
other animal protein classifications like dairy and pork, could allow for such estimations
to be made for the overall livestock industry. Although, such an all-encompassing model
may be difficult to produce, as different livestock groups have unique and varied
motives for making certain risk decisions for their type of operation.

49

REFERENCES

50

Barclay, E. A Nation of Meat Eaters: See How It All Adds Up. NPR. 2012.
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2012/06/27/155527365/visualizing-a-nationof-meat-eaters (Accessed 15 May 2018).
Bateman, I. J., B. H. Day, D. Dupont, and S. Georgiou. Ooh La La: Testing The OneAnd-One-Half Bound Dichotomous Choice Elicitation Method For Robustness To
Anomalies (Working Paper No. EDM 04-06). Norwich, UK and Ontario, Canada:
Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment
(CSERGE), School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia and
Department of Economics, Brock University. 2004.
Blake, J. P., Carey, John B, Haque, Aminul K. M., Malone, George W., P. H. Patterson,
N. L. Tablante, … S. Clark. ‘Poultry Carcass Disposal Options for Routine and
Catastrophic Mortality’. CAST Issue Paper 40(October 2008):20.
Bonhotal, Jean, and Schwarz, Mary. ‘Environmental Effects of Mortality Disposal’.
Presented at the 3rd International Symposium: Management of Animal
Carcasses, Tissue and Related Byproducts, University of California at Davis.
2009.
Burnett, K. M. ‘Introductions of Invasive Species: Failure of the Weaker Link’.
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 35,1(April 2006).
Chiburis, R., and M. Lokshin. ‘Maximum likelihood and two-step estimation of an
ordered-probit selection model’. The Stata Journal 7,2(2007):167–182.
Economics and Research Department (ERD). Estimation of Willingness to Pay. Slide
Show presented at the Session 2.2. 2013, April.
51

Fraser, R. ‘Compensation Payments and Animal Disease: Incentivizing Farmers Both to
Undertake Costly On-farm Biosecurity and to Comply with Disease Reporting
Requirements’. Environmental and Resource Economics (December 2016).
Gramig, B. M., B. J. Barnett, J. R. Skees, and J. R. Black. ‘Incentive compatibility in risk
management of contagious livestock diseases.’ In S. R. Koontz, D. L. Hoag, D.
D. Thilmany, J. W. Green, & J. L. Grannis (Eds.), The economics of livestock
disease insurance: concepts, issues and international case studies (pp. 39–52).
Wallingford: CABI. 2005.
Gramig, B. M., R. D. Horan, and C. A. Wolf. ‘Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When
Moral Hazard Is Followed by Adverse Selection’. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 91,3(August 2009):627–641.
Grannis, J. L., and M. L. Bruch. ‘The role of USDA-APHIS in livestock disease
management within the USA.’ In S. R. Koontz, D. L. Hoag, D. D. Thilmany, J. W.
Green, & J. L. Grannis (Eds.), The economics of livestock disease insurance:
concepts, issues and international case studies (pp. 19–28). Wallingford: CABI.
2005.
Gutiérrez, P. A., M. Pérez-Ortiz, J. Sánchez-Monedero, F. Fernández-Navarro, and C.
Hervás-Martínez. ‘Ordinal Regression Methods: Survey and Experimental Study’.
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 28,1(January
2016):127–146.

52

Gwyther, C. L., A. P. Williams, P. N. Golyshin, G. Edwards-Jones, and D. L. Jones. ‘The
environmental and biosecurity characteristics of livestock carcass disposal
methods: A review’. Waste Management 31,4(April 2011):767–778.
Hanmer, M. J., and K. O. Kalkan. ‘Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to
Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent
Variable Models’. American Journal of Political Science 57,1(January 2013):263–
277.
Hawkins, S., F. Walker, L. Strickland, and D. Barnett. ‘Commercial Poultry Producer’s
Guide to Disposal Options for HPAI Mortalities in Tennessee’ (2017):5.
Hayden, J., and L. Cole. ‘USDA Confirms Virulent Newcastle Disease in Backyard
Exhibition Birds in California, Not a Food Safety Concern’. 2018, May 18.
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/wcm/connect/APHIS_Content_Library/SA_Newsroo
m/SA_News/SA_By_Date/SA2018/vrn?presentationtemplate=APHIS_Design_Library%2FPT_Print_Friendly_N
ews_release (Accessed 13 June 2018).
Hennessy, D. A., and T. Wang. ‘Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Biosecurity
Externalities Exist’. Presented at the AAEA, CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual
Meeting, Denver, Colorado: Agricultural & Applied Economics Association. 2010.
Hennessy, D. A., and C. A. Wolf. ‘Asymmetric Information, Externalities and Incentives
in Animal Disease Prevention and Control’. Journal of Agricultural Economics
69,1(February 2018):226–242.

53

Henry, C. G., and L. L. Bitney. ‘Disposal Methods of Livestock and Poultry Mortality’.
University of Nebraska of Lincoln Extension ,EC727(2010):8.
Jin, H. J., A. Skripnitchenko, and W. W. Koo. The Effects of the BSE Outbreak in the
United States on the Beef and Cattle Industry (Special No. 03–4) (p. 17). Fargo,
ND: Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies Department of Agribusiness
and Applied Economics North Dakota State University. 2004.
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/23072/1/sr030004.pdf (Accessed 14
June 2018).
Julien, D., and S. Thomson. ‘Interactive methods to educate and engage poultry
producers on the importance of practicing on-farm biosecurity’. Journal of
Agricultural Extension and Rural Development 3,4(August 2011):137–140.
Katchova, A. ‘Ordered Probit and Logit Models’. Econometrics Academy.
Katchova, A. ‘Ordered Probit and Logit Models Example’. Econometrics Academy.
Kennedy, O. B., B. J. Stewart‐Knox, P. C. Mitchell, and D. I. Thurnham. ‘Consumer
perceptions of poultry meat: a qualitative analysis’. Nutrition & Food Science
34,3(June 2004):122–129.
Kennedy, P. A Guide to Econometrics (5th ed.). Simon Fraser University: Blackwell
Publishing. 2003.
Kuchler, F., and S. Hamm. ‘Animal disease incidence and indemnity eradication
programs’. Agricultural Economics 22,2000(2000):10.
Levin, J., and P. Milgrom. ‘Producer Theory’ (October 2004):23.

54

Lopez-Feldman, A. Introduction to Contingent Valuation using Stata (No. 41018) (p. 17).
Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 2012. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41018/
(Accessed
Maddala, G. S. Introduction to Econometrics. University of Florida: Macmillan Publishing
Company. 1988.
Meng, T., W. J. Florkowski, D. B. Sarpong, M. S. Chinnan, and A. V. A. Resurreccion.
‘Modeling Food Retail Format Choice and Shopping Frequency Decision in
Urban Ghana: A Multivariate Ordered Probit Regression Application’ (p. 18).
Presented at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association Annual Meeting,
Minneapolis, MN,. 2014.
Miller, M. ‘Hold the Patty, Not the Lettuce: Processing Foods for Over a Quarter Century
in the Nurses’ Health Study’. Circulation 122,9(August 2010):859–860.
Moore, C. An Introduction to Logistic and Probit Regression Models. University of
Texas. 2013, Fall.
Muhammad, A., and K. Jones. ‘The impact of federal indemnification on livestock
biosecurity’. Economics Bulletin 17,10(April 2008):1–9.
Mulwa, C., P. Marenya, D. B. Rahut, and M. Kassie. ‘Response to climate risks among
smallholder farmers in Malawi: A multivariate probit assessment of the role of
information, household demographics, and farm characteristics’. Climate Risk
Management 16(2017):208–221.
National Chicken Council. Per Capita Consumption of Poultry and Livestock, 1965 to
Estimated 2018, in Pounds. 2017. https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about55

the-industry/statistics/per-capita-consumption-of-poultry-and-livestock-1965-toestimated-2012-in-pounds/ (Accessed
Nicholson, W., and C. Snyder. Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions
(11th ed.). Ohio: South-Western Cengage Learning. 2012.
OECD. Producer Incentives in Livestock Disease Management. Paris: OECD
Publishing. 2017.
Okpukpara, B. ‘Determinants of willingness to pay for biosecurity measures among
poultry farmers: a mitigation response to bird flu incidence in Nigeria’. The
Journal of Animal & Plant Sciences 26,5(2016):1418–1428.
Ott, S. ‘Issues associated with US livestock disease compensation in the 21st century.’
In S. R. Koontz, D. L. Hoag, D. D. Thilmany, J. W. Green, & J. L. Grannis (Eds.),
The economics of livestock disease insurance: concepts, issues and international
case studies (pp. 68–81). Wallingford: CABI. 2005.
Qualtrics. ‘Piped Text’. 2015, April 23. https://www.qualtrics.com/support/surveyplatform/survey-module/editing-questions/piped-text/piped-text-overview/
(Accessed 8 January 2019).
Rimm, E. ‘Ask the doctor. I saw Harvard’s Healthy Eating Plate and noticed that poultry
was listed as a healthy protein. I am not surprised that you’re recommending fish,
nuts, or beans. But why poultry?’ Harvard Health Letter 37,2(2011):2.
Samal, P., S. Pandey, G. A. K. Kumar, and B. C. Barah. ‘Rice Ecosystems and Factors
Affecting Varietal Adoption in Rainfed Coastal Orissa: A Multivariate Probit
Analysis§’. Agricultural Economics Research Review 24(June 2011):7.
56

Siekkinen, K.-M., J. Heikkilä, N. Tammiranta, and H. Rosengren. ‘Measuring the costs
of biosecurity on poultry farms: a case study in broiler production in Finland’. Acta
Veterinaria Scandinavica 54,1(2012):12.
Speer, N. ‘Industry At A Glance: Retail Meat Prices’. BEEF Magazine (December 2013).
2013, December 11.
Spiegel, A. ‘Chicken More Popular Than Beef In U.S. For First Time In 100 Years’.
HuffPost. 2014, January 2.
Sumner, D. A., J. E. Bervejillo, and L. Jarvis. ‘The role of public policy in controlling
animal disease.’ In S. R. Koontz, D. L. Hoag, D. D. Thilmany, J. W. Green, & J. L.
Grannis (Eds.), The economics of livestock disease insurance: concepts, issues
and international case studies (pp. 29–38). Wallingford: CABI. 2005.
Thompson, J. M., G. T. Tonsor, D. L. Pendell, and W. Preston. ‘United States feedlot
operator willingness to pay for disposal capacity to address foreign animal
disease risk’. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases 65,6(December
2018):1951–1958.
Tonsor, G. T., J. R. Mintert, and T. C. Schroeder. ‘U.S. Meat Demand: Household
Dynamics and Media Information Impacts’. Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics 35,1(2010):1–17.
Tonsor, G. T., T. C. Schroeder, and J. L. Lusk. ‘Consumer Valuation of Alternative Meat
Origin Labels’. Journal of Agricultural Economics 64,3(September 2013):676–
692.

57

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service. ‘Newcastle Disease:
USDA ARS’. 2016, August 13. https://www.ars.usda.gov/southeast-area/athensga/us-national-poultry-research-center/exotic-emerging-avian-viral-diseasesresearch/docs/newcastle-disease/ (Accessed 22 April 2018).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. The HPAI
Indemnity and Compensation Process (No. 91-85–013). 2017.
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/2016/hpai-indemnity.pdf
(Accessed 15 June 2018).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary
Services. ‘Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan— the Red Book’
(2015):212.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary
Services. 2016 HPAI Preparedness and Response Plan. 2016.
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/ai/hpaipreparedness-and-response-plan-2015.pdf (Accessed 20 April 2018).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary
Services. ‘Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Response: Ready
Reference Guide--Overview of Zones’. National Preparedness and Incident
Coordination (NPIC).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary
Services, and National Animal Health Monitoring System. Part 1: Reference of

58

Health and Management Practices on Table-Egg Farms in the United States,
2013 (Layers 2013 No. 685.0614) (pp. 1–108). Fort Collins, CO. 2014.
U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service. ‘Cash receipts by State’.
2016a.
https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17843#Pc3d37317341b45c6bf19592e
1fa69b0c_2_17iT0R0x0 (Accessed 28 June 2018).
U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service. ‘Farm finance indicators
State ranking’. 2016b.
https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17839#P3898b53ab9a34343988f894b
64d1e295_2_185iT0R0x3 (Accessed 28 June 2018).
U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. ‘Fact Sheet:
USDA Poultry Production Data’.
U.S. Government. ‘U.S. Constitution’, Pub. L. No. 5th Amendment (1992).
U.S. Government. ‘U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 9 - Animals and Animal
Products, Chapter I - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Department of
Agriculture, Subchapter B - Cooperative Control and Eradication of Livestock and
Poultry Diseases’ (2000).
U.S. Government. ‘United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 5, Title 7 Agriculture’, Chapter 109-Animal Health Protection 7 C.F.R. §8301, 8303 § 83018308 (2012).
USDA-NASS. Poultry - Production and Value 2016 Summary 04/28/2017 (p. 14). 2016.

59

Wooldridge, J. M. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (1st ed.).
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 2001.

60

APPENDICES

61

Appendix A

Figure 1.1 Example of Zones, Areas, and Premises in HPAI Outbreak Response
(USDA-APHIS-VS 2015)

62

Figure 1.2 Map of States Represented in “Midwest” Variable
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of Select Poultry Producer Survey Responses
Variable
Bio Q

Description

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1 if will adopt; 0 otherwise 21

0.476

0.512

0

1

Bio Cost1

Cost of adoption that
producer was presented

53

24.703

13.903

2.057

47.428

Onsite

Current onsite carcass
disposal %

53

40.189

49.009

0

100

Death Loss

Operation’s livestock
mortality rate

23

4.150

2.775

0

10

Small

1 if  149,999 birds; 0
otherwise

15

0.267

0.458

0

1

Midwest

1 if operation located in
Midwest3; 0 otherwise

53

0.057

0.233

0

1

1 if ownership of operation 53
is  81%; 0 otherwise

0.113

0.320

0

1

Full Own
Prob 1 or Less

Producer perception of
FAD2 outbreak affecting
individual operation once
in next 100 years

53

0.057

0.233

0

1

Producer perception of
FAD2 outbreak affecting
individual operation once
in next 25 years
1 In thousandths of dollars
2 Foreign Animal Disease
3 See Figure 1.2

53

0.189

0.395

0

1

Prob 1 to 5
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Table 1.2 Simplified Probit Model Results of Producer Willingness to Adopt
Additional Disposal Capacity (in thousandths of $)
Variable
BioCost
Constant

Coef.
0.009
-0.281

Std. Err.
0.019
0.526

z
0.49
-0.53

P>z
0.624
0.594

[95% Conf.
-0.028
-1.312

Interval]
0.047
0.750

Willingness
to Pay

29.609

31.81

0.93

0.352

-32.737

91.956

Table 1.3 Simplified Probit Model Marginal Effects of Producer Willingness to
Adopt Additional Disposal Capacity (in thousandths of $)
Variable
BioCost

dy/dx
0.004

Delta-method
Std. Err.
0.008

z
0.50

P>z
0.618

[95% Conf.
-0.011

Interval]
0.018
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Table 1.4 Probit Model Results of Producer Willingness to Adopt Additional
Disposal Capacity (in thousandths of $)
Variable
Bio Cost
Onsite
Death Loss
Small
Midwest
Full Own
Prob 1 or Less
Prob 1 to 5
Constant
Willingness to
Pay

-0.277
1.090

Robust
Std. Err.
0.024
0.008
0.159
0.887
0.990
0.814
(omitted)
0.836
1.514

-579.886

17092.87

Coef.
0.001
-0.010
0.107
-1.316
-0.252
-1.654

z
0.04
-1.26
0.67
-1.48
-0.25
-2.03

P>z
0.971
0.209
0.502
0.138
0.799
0.042

[95% Conf.
-0.047
-0.027
-0.205
-3.054
-2.193
-3.250

Interval]
0.049
0.006
0.418
0.422
1.689
-0.059

-0.33
0.72

0.741
0.471

-1.915
-1.877

1.362
4.058

-0.03

0.973

-34081.3

32921.53

Table 1.5 Probit Model Marginal Effects of Producer Willingness to Adopt
Additional Disposal Capacity (in thousandths of $)
Variable
Bio Cost
Onsite
Death Loss
Small
Midwest
Full Own
Prob 1 to 5

dy/dx
0.000
-0.003
0.033
-0.411
-0.079
-0.517
-0.086

Delta-method
Std. Err.
0.008
0.003
0.049
0.236
0.308
0.179
0.265

z
0.04
-1.18
0.68
-1.74
-0.26
-2.89
-0.33

P>z
0.971
0.240
0.495
0.081
0.798
0.004
0.745

[95% Conf.
-0.015
-0.009
-0.063
-0.874
-0.682
-0.868
-0.607

Interval]
0.015
0.002
0.129
0.051
0.525
-0.166
0.434
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Table 1.6 Interval Regression Results of Producer Willingness to Adopt
Additional Disposal Capacity
Variable

Coef.

Robust
Std. Err.

Onsite
Death Loss
Small
Midwest
Full Own
Prob 1 or less
Prob 1 to 5
Constant

-489
1,145
-19,549
-21,215
-37,490
20,428
-36,460
83,304

147.631
2,195.073
11,767.170
15,141.870
14,738.380
18,270.090
6,907.455
.

-3.32
0.52
-1.66
-1.40
-2.54
1.12
-5.28
.

0.001
0.602
0.097
0.161
0.011
0.264
0.000
.

-779
-3,157
-42,612
-50,892
-66,377
-15,381
-49,999
.

-200
5,447
3,514
8,463
-8,603
56,236
-22,922
.

/lnsigma

10

0.546

17.41

0.000

8

11

sigma

13,489

7,369.740

721

1,203

Willingness to
Pay

15,651

8,061.346

-149

31,451

z

P>z

4,622.92 39,358.230
1.94

0.052

[95% Conf. Interval]
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Select Feedlot Operator Survey Responses
Variables
Market Value

Description
Indemnity as fair market value

N
64

Mean
1.766

Std. Dev.
1.004

Min
1

Max
4

Farm Receipts

Indemnity as cost of raising
animal using farm receipts

64

2.703

1.079

1

4

Biosecurity

Indemnity based on “besteffort” biosecurity practices

64

2.875

1.062

1

4

Subsidy

Indemnity tied to livestock
insurance with government
paid subsidies
1 if operation located in
Midwest2; 0 otherwise

64

2.656

1.011

1

4

139

0.331

0.472

0

1

139

0.295

0.458

0

1

1 if  1,999 head; 0 otherwise 139

0.302

0.461

0

1

Midwest
Full Own
Small

1 if ownership of operation is
 81%; 0 otherwise

Onsite

Current onsite carcass
disposal %

100

49.96

47.924

0

100

Death Loss

Operation’s livestock mortality
rate

82

1.926

1.461

0.03

10

Prob 1 or Less

Producer perception of FAD1
outbreak affecting individual
operation once in next 100
years

77

0.338

0.476

0

1

Producer perception of FAD1
outbreak affecting individual
operation once in next 25
years
1 Foreign Animal Disease
2 See Figure 1.2

77

0.455

0.501

0

1

Prob1 to 5%
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Producer Indemnity Policy Preferences
26.56
4

29.69

9.38
25.00
3

28.13

Rank

12.50
15.63

2

34.38

34.38

35.94
25.00
23.44

12.50
15.63
17.19

1

0.00

10.00

IndemSubsidy

54.69
20.00

IndemBiosecurity

30.00
Percent

40.00

IndemFarmReceipt

50.00

60.00

IndemMarketValue

Figure 2.1 Initial Survey Tabulations for Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy
Preferences
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Table 2.2 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Results for Feedlot Operator
Indemnity Policy Preferences
Variables
Midwest

Market
Value
0.102

Indemnity Policy Choice
Farm
Biosecurity
Receipts
Efforts
-0.152
-0.003

Subsidized
Insurance
0.043

(0.351)

(0.320)

(0.376)

(0.248)

-0.304

0.251

-0.282

0.289

(0.317)

(0.338)

(0.332)

(0.309)

-0.183

0.0146

0.637**

-0.414

(0.334)

(0.381)

(0.313)

(0.340)

0.001

-0.004

0.002

0

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.003)

0.0597

0.093

-0.074

-0.076

(0.120)

(0.152)

(0.0694)

(0.0625)

-0.031

0.029

0.218

-0.298

(0.470)

(0.406)

(0.433)

(0.359)

-0.382

0.148

0.783*

-0.592*

(0.408)

(0.334)

(0.410)

(0.326)

Constant cut1

-0.170

-0.842**

-0.466

-1.766***

(0.600)

(0.418)

(0.634)

(0.430)

Constant cut2

0.500

-0.072

0.081

-0.623

(0.611)

(0.420)

(0.629)

(0.422)

Constant cut3

1.092*

0.690

1.057*

0.087

(0.615)

(0.440)

(0.634)

(0.423)

Full Own
Small
Onsite
Death Loss
Prob 1 or less
Prob 1 to 5%

Observations

64
64
64
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

64
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Table 2.3 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for
Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy Preferences: Indemnity
as Market Value
Variables
Midwest
Full Own
Small
Onsite
Death Loss
Prob 1 or less
Prob 1 to 5%

Choice 1
-0.040
0.120
0.073
0.000
-0.024
0.012
0.151

Choice 2
0.010
-0.031
-0.019
0.000
0.006
-0.002
-0.038

Choice 3
0.014
-0.042
-0.025
0.000
0.008
-0.004
-0.052

Choice 4
0.016
-0.047
-0.029
0.000
0.009
-0.006
-0.060

Table 2.4 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for
Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy Preferences: Indemnity
as Farm Receipts
Variables
Midwest
Full Own
Small
Onsite
Death Loss
Prob 1 or less
Prob 1 to 5%

Choice 1
0.037
-0.062
-0.004
0.001
-0.023
-0.008
-0.037

Choice 2
0.022
-0.036
-0.002
0.001
-0.013
-0.004
-0.021

Choice 3
-0.007
0.012
0.001
0.000
0.004
0.002
0.007

Choice 4
-0.052
0.086
0.005
-0.001
0.032
0.010
0.051
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Table 2.5 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for
Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy Preferences: Indemnity
as Biosecurity Efforts
Variables
Midwest
Full Own
Small
Onsite
Death Loss
Prob 1 or less
Prob 1 to 5%

Choice 1 Choice 2
0.001
0.000
0.062
0.035
-0.139**
-0.079
0.000
0.000
0.016
0.009
-0.065
-0.020
-0.182
-0.089*
** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Choice 3
0.000
0.006
-0.013
0.000
0.002
0.020
-0.001

Choice 4
-0.001
-0.103
0.232**
0.001
-0.027
0.065
0.273**

Table 2.6 Ranked-Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for
Feedlot Operator Indemnity Policy Preferences: Indemnity
as Subsidized Insurance
Variables
Midwest
FullOwn
Small
Onsite
DeathLoss
Prob 1 or
Less
Prob 1 to 5%

Choice 1
-0.008
-0.056
0.080
0.000
0.015
0.043
0.104*

Choice 2
-0.009
-0.059
0.085
0.000
0.015
0.071
0.126*
* p<0.1

Choice 3
0.003
0.022
-0.031
0.000
-0.006

Choice 4
0.014
0.093
-0.134
0.000
-0.024

-0.005
-0.032

-0.108
-0.199*

72

Appendix B
Poultry Biosecurity Survey
Biosecurity is a collection of management practices designed to minimize the risk of
disease introduction and spread. One objective of this study is to assess current and
possible future carcass disposal methods of U.S. poultry farms. The following questions
will refer to "your operation." If your operation includes multiple farms or houses, please
answer for them collectively.

Q0 Of the birds that were raised on your operation in the past 12 months, how would
you classify your operation?
 Broiler (1)
 Table Egg-layer (2)
 Turkey (3)
 Primary Breeder – Broiler (4)
 Primary Breeder – Turkey (5)
 Other (6)

Q1 Of the birds that died on your operation in the past 12 months, what percentage
were disposed of by the following methods?
______ Renderer (offsite) (1)
______ Landfill (offsite) (2)
______ Buried (on operation property) (3)
______ Composted (on operation property) (4)
______ Other (please specify) (5)

Q2 What is your best estimate of the $/bird costs associated for your operation if you
were to use the following alternative disposal methods given volumes presented by
typical death loss on your operation?
______ Renderer (offsite) (1)
______ Landfill (offsite) (2)
______ Buried (on operation property) (3)
______ Composted (on operation property) (4)

Q3 What is your best estimate of typical death loss rates (%) (mortality rates) on your
operation?
______ Death loss rate (%) (15)
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Q4 Suppose in the next 10 years operations in your region experience a severe disease
(e.g. highly pathogenic avian influenza) leading to governmental and industry-wide calls
for quick changes in numerous farming practices to reduce spread and duration of the
disease. One possible adjustment could be to entirely cease use of off-site disposal
methods (e.g. renderer or landfill) and require sole use of on-site methods (e.g. burying
or composting) for a period of 2 months.
In advance of this situation, your operation could elect to proactively establish the ability
to solely use on-site disposal for carcasses and be capable to handle volumes
equivalent to 2 months of your operation’s normal death rates.
Given knowledge of this situation and the implications it may present to your operation,
if it costs $${e://Field/BioCost} in one-time, fixed expenses to establish this capacity on
your operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 months would you make this investment
within the next 3 years?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
Condition: No Is Selected. Skip To: Q5.a Gov cost share option. Condition: Yes Is
Selected. Skip To: Q4.YES. Doubling value.

Q4.yes Suppose alternatively it costs $(2*$${e://Field/BioCost}) in one-time, fixed
expenses to establish this capacity on your operation to dispose on-site for at least 2
months would you make this investment within the next 3 years?
 Yes (23)
 No (24)
Condition: Yes Is Selected. Skip To: Q6 Perceived likelihood of disease. Condition: No
Is Selected. Skip To: Q6 Perceived likelihood of disease.

Q5.a You indicated you would not make this $${e://Field/BioCost} one-time investment.
Suppose there was a governmental cost-share program available that would
cover ${e://Field/GovCoverPercent}% of the costs leaving the remaining 100% for you
to cover. In this case would you proceed to make this investment within the next 3
years?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Q5.b You indicated you would not make this $${e://Field/BioCost} one-time investment.
Suppose the government established a rule that would make indemnity payments to
those experiencing financial hardship in times of severe animal disease, would be
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prioritized first for operations who could provide documented evidence of “best-effort”
biosecurity practices being in place. If this policy was in place, would you proceed to
make this investment within the next 3 years?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Q6 How likely do you think it is for the U.S. poultry industry to experience a severe
disease event resulting in your operation having to solely use on-site disposal for at
least two months?
 This will not occur in the next 200 years (nearly a 0% chance) (1)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 200 years (0.5% chance) (2)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 100 years (1% chance) (3)
 This may occur 1 times in the next 50 years (2% chance) (4)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 25 years (4% chance) (5)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 10 years (10% chance) (6)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 5 years (20% chance) (7)
 This may occur 2 or more times in the next 5 years (greater than 20%
chance) (8)

Q7 Further, suppose in the severe disease situation mentioned earlier governmental
indemnity funds were available to help offset financial hardship of operations who
depopulated birds. How would you rank the following options for establishing indemnity
payments (1= highly preferred, 4 = not preferred)?
______ Indemnity equal to current market value of bird if sold on day of claim (1)
______ Indemnity equal to current market value or cost to raise bird, whichever is the
highest but requires producers sharing farm receipts (2)
______ Indemnity funds available based upon evidence of “best-effort” biosecurity
practices being in place through farm inspections (3)
______ Indemnity funds available through private insurance programs, where premiums
are subsidized by the government (4)

Q8 In what state does your operation primarily raise birds?
 Drop down list of every state
Q9 How many birds were raised on your total operation in the last 12 months?
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Less than 5,000 birds (1)
5,000 to 24,999 birds (2)
25,000 to 49,999 birds (3)
50,000 to 74,999 birds (4)
75,000 to 99,999 birds (5)
100,000 to 124,999 birds (6)
125,000 to 149,999 birds (7)
150,000 to 199,999 birds (8)
More than 200,000 birds (9)

Q10 Of the birds placed on your operation in the last 12 months, what percentage did
your operation own (as opposed to someone outside the operation retaining ownership
such as an integrator)?
 0% (1)
 1 to 20% (2)
 21 to 40% (3)
 41 to 60% (4)
 61 to 80% (5)
 81 to 100% (6)

Q11 Thank you for your participation! Please leave any comments here:
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Feedlot Biosecurity Survey
Biosecurity is a collection of management practices designed to minimize the risk of
disease introduction and spread. One objective of this study is to assess current and
possible future carcass disposal methods of U.S. feedlots. The following questions will
refer to "your operation." Please answer the questions when considering the finishing
feedlot(s) in your operation. If your operation includes multiple feedlots, please answer
for them collectively.
Q1 Of the cattle that died on your operation in the past 12 months, what percentage
were disposed of by the following methods?
______ Renderer (offsite)
______ Landfill (offsite)
______ Buried (on this feedlot property)
______ Composted (on this feedlot property)
______ Other (please specify)
Q2 What is your best estimate of the $/head costs associated for your operation if you
were to use the following alternative disposal methods given volumes presented by
typical death loss on your operation?
______ Renderer (offsite)
______ Landfill (offsite)
______ Buried (on this feedlot property)
______ Composted (on this feedlot property)
Q3 What is your best estimate of typical death loss rates (%) on your operation?
______ Death loss rate (%)
Q4 Suppose in the next 10 years operations in your region experience a severe disease
(e.g. Foot and Mouth Disease) leading to governmental and industry-wide calls for quick
changes in numerous feedlot practices to reduce spread and duration of the
disease. One possible adjustment could be to entirely cease use of off-site disposal
methods (e.g. renderer or landfill) and require sole use of on-site methods (e.g. burying
or composting) for a period of 2 months.
In advance of this situation, your operation could elect to proactively establish the ability
to solely use on-site disposal for carcasses and be capable to handle volumes
equivalent to 2 months of your operation’s normal death rates.
Given knowledge of
this situation and the implications it may present to your operation, if it costs
$${e://Field/BioCost} in one-time, fixed expenses to establish this capacity on your
operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 months would you make this investment within
the next 3 years?
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 Yes
 No
Condition: No Is Selected. Skip To: Q5.a Gov cost share option.Condition: Yes Is
Selected. Skip To: Q4.YES. Doubling value.
Q4.YES Suppose alternatively it costs $0 in one-time, fixed expenses to establish this
capacity on your operation to dispose on-site for at least 2 months would you make this
investment within the next 3 years?
 Yes
 No
Condition: Yes Is Selected. Skip To: Q6 Perceived likelihood of disease.Condition: No Is
Selected. Skip To: Q6 Perceived likelihood of disease.
Q5.a You indicated you would not make this $${e://Field/BioCost} one-time
investment. Suppose there was a governmental cost-share program available that
would cover ${e://Field/GovCoverPercent}% of the costs leaving the remaining 100% for
you to cover. In this case would you proceed to make this investment within the next 3
years?
 Yes
 No
Q5.b You indicated you would not make this $${e://Field/BioCost} one-time
investment. Suppose the government established a rule that would make indemnity
payments to those experiencing financial hardship in times of severe animal disease,
would be prioritized first for operations who could provide documented evidence of
“best-effort” biosecurity practices being in place. If this policy was in place, would you
proceed to make this investment within the next 3 years?
 Yes
 No
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Q6 How likely do you think it is for the U.S. feedlot industry to experience a severe
disease event resulting in your operation having to solely use on-site disposal for at
least two months?
 This will not occur in the next 200 years (nearly a 0% chance)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 200 years (0.5% chance)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 100 years (1% chance)
 This may occur 1 times in the next 50 years (2% chance)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 25 years (4% chance)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 10 years (10% chance)
 This may occur 1 time in the next 5 years (20% chance)
 This may occur 2 or more times in the next 5 years (greater than 20% chance)
Q7 Further, suppose in the severe disease situation mentioned earlier governmental
indemnity funds were available to help offset financial hardship of operations who
depopulated livestock. How would you rank the following options for establishing
indemnity payments (1= highly preferred, 4 = not preferred)?
______ Indemnity equal to current market value of animal if sold on day of claim
______ Indemnity equal to current market value or cost to raise animal, whichever is the
highest but requires feedlots sharing farm receipts
______ Indemnity funds available based upon evidence of “best-effort” biosecurity
practices being in place through feedlot inspection
______ Indemnity funds available through private insurance programs, where premiums
are subsidized by the government
Q8 In what state does your operation primarily feed cattle?
 Drop down list of every state
Q9 How many fed cattle were sold on your operation in the last 12 months?
 Less than 1,000 head
 1,000 to 1,999 head
 2,000 to 3,999 head
 4,000 to 7,999 head
 8,000 to 15,999 head
 16,000 to 23,999 head
 24,000 to 31,999 head
 32,000 to 49,999 head
 More than 50,000 head
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Q10 Of the animals placed on feed in the last 12 months, what percentage did your
operation own (as opposed to someone outside the operation retaining ownership)?
 0% (1)
 1 to 20%
 21 to 40%
 41 to 60%
 61 to 80%
 81 to 100%
Q11 Thank you for your participation! Please leave any comments here:
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